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Abstract

A run-time monitor shares computational resources, such as memory and CPU time,
with the target program. Furthermore, heavy computation performed by a monitor
for checking target program's execution with respect to requirement properties can
be a bottleneck to the target program's execution. Therefore, computational characteristics of run-time monitoring cause a signi cant impact on the target program's
execution.
We investigate computational issues on run-time monitoring. The rst issue is
the power of run-time monitoring. In other words, we study the class of properties
run-time monitoring can evaluate. The second issue is computational complexity
of evaluating properties written in process algebraic language. Third, we discuss
sound abstraction of the target program's execution, which does not change the
result of property evaluation. This abstraction can be used as a technique to reduce
monitoring overhead. Theoretical understanding obtained from these issues a ects
the implementation of Java-MaC, a toolset for the run-time monitoring and checking
of Java programs. Finally, we demonstrate the abstraction-based overhead reduction
technique implemented in Java-MaC through a case study.
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Introduction

The purpose of run-time analysis based on formal requirements is to bridge the
gap left by the two traditional analysis techniques: veri cation and testing.
On the one hand, formal veri cation analyzes all possible executions of the
system, but the analysis is performed on the speci cation of the system, not
its implementation. In addition, state-of-the-art veri cation techniques still
do not scale up well to handle large systems. On the other hand, testing is
applied to a system implementation, but does not guarantee that all behaviors
of the implementation are explored and analyzed. In either case, run-time
analysis can provide additional assurance that the current execution is correct
with respect to its requirements. Run-time analysis can nd violations to the
requirements in time and help users to take recovery actions before critical
failure happens.
While this additional assurance is an invaluable help to detect and recover
errors, this bene t comes at the cost of slowed target program's execution
due to monitoring overhead. Monitoring overhead consists of two factors: information extraction overhead and evaluation overhead. Information extraction overhead occurs due to the execution of probes inserted into the target
system. Evaluation overhead occurs when a monitor evaluates requirement
properties. Unless special hardware is attached to the target system for intercepting execution information, probes inserted into the target system share
computational resources, such as memory and CPU time, of the target system to extract execution information. Evaluation overhead, however, occurs
even when special hardware is utilized. Suppose that the requirement properties are large and complex. Then, the speed of evaluating the properties
is slower than the execution speed of the target program, which makes the
target program wait until the evaluation nishes. Probes send snapshots of
the target program's execution to the ( nite) snapshot bu er based on which
a monitor evaluates the properties. When the snapshot bu er becomes full,
probe should stop the target program's execution until the bu er has room.
Some monitoring system [2] prevents the target system from waiting for the
monitor by overwriting snapshots while a monitor is busy to evaluate properties. This approach, however, cannot guarantee correct evaluation and is
not adequate for run-time veri cation. As described above, computational
characteristics of run-time monitoring, especially property evaluation, cause a
signi cant impact on target program execution.
We investigate computational issues on run-time monitoring which are not
limited to speci c monitoring architecture, but universal. The rst issue is
on the computational power of run-time monitoring. In other words, we investigate the class of properties which run-time monitoring can evaluate at
run-time, i.e, in nite time. We show that this class of properties does not
coincide with safety properties, but a strict subset of safety properties. The
second issue we study is computational complexity of evaluating properties
2

Kim et al
written in process algebraic language. We formulated this problem as a trace
validity problem and proved that the evaluating properties written in CCS is
a NP-complete problem using 3SAT problem. As far as we know, these results
are new contributions to the run-time monitoring eld. Finally, we develop a
sound abstraction technique on target program execution so that a monitor
evaluates properties less frequently but does not miss violation to the properties. This technique, called value abstraction, can be used to reduce monitoring
overhead. We demonstrate this overhead reduction technique implemented in
Java-MaC in the case study of monitoring the Sieve of Eratosthenes program.
Section 2 shows that the class of properties run-time monitoring can evaluate is a strict subset of safety properties. Section 3 proves that the problem of
evaluating properties written in process algebra is NP-complete. Section 4 explains value abstraction. Section 5 brie y describes Java-MaC and the impact
of previously mentioned issues on Java-MaC. Section 6 shows the experimental result of applying value abstraction to monitor the Sieve of Eratosthenes.
Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2

A Class of Monitorable Properties

Run-time monitoring has weaker power of evaluating requirement properties
than veri cation has. It is because run-time monitoring observes target program execution of nite length while veri cation searches whole (possibly
in nite ) execution. Thus, it is obvious that run-time monitoring cannot evaluate liveness properties. We generally presume that the class of properties
run-time monitoring can evaluate is safety properties. In this section, however, we study the class of properties run-time monitoring can evaluate more
precisely. We call a property run-time monitoring can evaluate as \a monitorable property". We start discussion on monitorable properties by de ning
\execution" and \property" formally.
De nition 1 (Execution) An execution of a program is an in nite sequence
of program states  = s0 s1 ::: where si 2 S (a set of program states), s0 2 Sinit
(a set of initial states), and  [i::j ] is the subsequence of  from a state si to a
state sj .

The de nition of an execution can apply to nite sequences by obtaining an
in nite sequence from a nite one by repeating the nal state of the nite
sequence. This corresponds to the view that a terminating execution is the
same as non-terminating execution in which after some nite time (once the
program has terminated ) the state remains xed.
De nition 2 (Property) A property is a set of executions. We write  j= P
to denote that  is in property P .

Let us de ne safety property formally. Informally speaking, safety property means that bad things do not happen during the execution of a program.
Consider a safety property Psafe that means some bad thing x does not hap3
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pen. If  6j= Psafe,  includes some bad thing which cannot be remedied. In
other words, there is some pre x of  which includes some bad thing for which
no extension will satisfy Psafe. We use S ! as the set of in nite sequences of
states.

De nition 3 (Safety Property) A property P  S ! is a safety property if
for every  2 S ! ,  2 P if and only if 8i9 2 S ! ( [0::i] 2 P ) where S is
the set of program states.

It is clear from De nition 3 that a monitorable property is a safety property.
A monitor can evaluate a property based on only a nite number of execution
states. A safety property, however, is not necessarily a monitorable property.
The de nition of safety property makes no computational assumptions ; it is
possible to de ne a property that is a safety property, but which is unlikely
to be monitorable. Safety closure of the halting problem is a safety property
but not a monitorable property.
Example 1 Let  = f0; 1; a; bg. Consider a nite property H = fx  a 
y j x; y 2 f0; 1g; the Turing Machine encoded by x halts on input yg. We
de ne a property H! = H  b! [ f0; 1g  a  f0; 1g! [ f0; 1g! .
The property H! , de ned above is a safety property. In order to see this,
we only need to observe that for any execution not in H! , there is nite pre x
when this violation can be detected. Executions not in H! are those that are
not in the \right format", or where the nite pre x before the sequence of b's
is not in H ; in both cases there is a nite pre x that provides evidence of the
execution not being in the property.
However, in order to detect that an execution  is not in H! , we have to
check for membership in H. Since membership in H (or the Halting problem)
is not decidable, it is impossible for us to design monitors that would be able to
detect a violation of this property. This suggests that the class of monitorable
properties is a strict subset of a class of safety properties (see Figure 1); they
should be such that sequences not in the properties should be recognizable by
a Turing Machine, after examining a nite pre x. Therefore, we can de ne a
monitorable property as follows. We use pref() for  2 S ! as the set of all
nite pre xes of .
4

De nition 4 (Monitorable Property) A property P  S ! is said to be
monitorable if and only if P is a safety property and S  n pref(P ) is recursively
enumerable, where pref(P ) = [2P pref( )
3

Evaluation of Properties in Process Algebra

Requirement properties need to be described in a property speci cation language. The characteristics of the property speci cation language can a ect the
4

For more detailed discussion on monitorable language, see [8].

4

Kim et al
Properties
Safety
Properties
Liveness
Properties

Monitorable
Properties

Fig. 1. Monitorable properties

computational complexity of evaluating properties. [7] shows the monitoring
overhead due to non-determisim in requirement properties in their monitoring
system, called Supervisor, and provides heuristics to decrease the overhead.
[3] develops a linear time monitoring algorithm for safety formulae written in
past time LTL. In this section, we will discuss the computational complexity
of monitoring algorithm for property written in process algebra.
Run-time monitoring can be thought of as a trace validity problem where
a trace is generated from the execution of the program. The trace validity
problem is a membership checking problem of deciding whether a given trace is
in the set of valid traces. For suÆciently expressive requirement speci cation
languages such as CCS [6] or ACSR [1], this problem turns out to be NPcomplete. We formulate the trace validity problem using the notation of [6].
3.1 Notations

We will denote the ith character in a string x by x i . A is an set of names
a; b; c; :::. Then, A is the set of co-names a; b; c; :::; A and A are disjoint and
are in bijection via ( ); we declare a = a. L = A[A denotes the set of labels.
We also introduce a distinguished silent action  62 L. We set Act = L [ f g.
( )

De nition 5 The set of processes is de ned by
P ::= Nil j :P j P + Q j P jjQ j P nL
where L  L and 2 Act.
De nition 6 The labeled transition relation ! between two processes is dened by the following rules. In the following rules, 2 Act; l 2 L, and L  L.
[P refix]
:P ! P
0
0
[Choice] P ! P 0 Q ! Q 0
P +Q!P P +Q!Q
P ! P0
Q ! Q0
P !l P 0; Q !l Q0
[P arallel]

P jjQ ! P 0 jjQ P jjQ ! P jjQ0 P jjQ !
P 0jjQ0

5
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0
[Restriction] P ! P 0 where 62 L [ L

P nL ! P
De nition 7 Given processes P and P 0 , and 2 L, we say that P ) P 0 if
 
  0
 
P (!
) ! (!
) P , where (!
) is the transitive re exive closure of ! .
3.2 Trace Validity Problem

In this section, we formulate the trace validity problem using the notations in
Section 3.1.
De nition 8 (Valid Trace) A string s 2 L , of length n, is said to be a
valid trace of a process P , if there exist processes P0 ; P1 ; : : : ; Pn, such that
i
P  P0 , and P(i 1) s) Pi , for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
( )

Then, the Trace Validity Problem is formally de ned as follows:
Input
A process P and a string s 2 L.
Output Is s a valid trace of P ?

Theorem 3.1 The trace validity problem is NP-complete.
Proof.

To prove hardness, we reduce 3SAT to the trace validity problem. We
are given a formula ' in conjunctive normal form with variables x ; : : : ; xn
and clauses C ; : : : ; Cm, each with three literals. We construct a process P (')
and a string s(') such that s(') is a valid trace of P (') i the formula ' is
satis able.
For each i, de ne processes, Xi, as follows,
Xi = :Fi + :Ti
Fi = fi :Fi
Ti = ti :Ti
In our reduction, these processes express a truth value assignment to the
variables. If the Xi ! Fi then it expresses the fact that under this assignment
the variable xi gets the value false, and if Xi ! Ti then it means that the
variable xi gets the value true.
In addition to these processes, we de ne another process, P . The idea is
that P will deadlock, when run concurrently with the processes Xi , i the
truth assignment de ned (as above) by the processes Xi is not a satisfying
truth assignment for the formula '.
In order to de ne the process P , we assume that Ci  li; _ li; _ li; for
i 2 f1; : : : mg and j 2 f1; 2; 3g in following formulas.
6
1

1

def
def

def

1

2
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P def
= Q1
Q1 def
= a:L1;1 + a:L1;2 + a:L1;3

...

Qi def
= a:L
8 i;1 + a:Li;2 + a:Li;3
< f :L0 if l  :xk
Li;j def
= : k 0i;j i;j
tk :Li;j if li;j  xk
L0i;j def
= b:Qi+1

...

L0m;j def
= b:Q1
The process P (') is thus (P jjX1jj   jjXn) n ft1; f1; : : : ; tn; fng. The property this process has is that, for any i; j , the transition Li;j ! L0i;j can be
taken i the literal li;j gets the truth value true under the truth assignment
de ned by the processes X1; : : : ; Xn. Hence, Qi ! Qi+1 can take place i one
of the literals in the clause Ci gets the truth value true under the assignment
described by X1; : : : ; Xn. Thus it can be seen that abab : : : ab is a valid trace
of P (') i ' has a satisfying assignment.

To prove completeness, we prove that Trace Validity Problem belongs to
NP. We can view a process P as a labeled transition graph GP over a set of
label L rooted at the node nP . For a given process P and a string s 2 L , we
choose a path p corresponding to s from nP be the certi cate. Checking can
be accomplished in polynomial time by traversing GP from nP following p.

2

The main reason for NP-completeness in the trace validity problem is nondeterminism caused by parallel composition of processes. We should be careful
to de ne or use a requirement property speci cation language so that trace
validation against properties is tractable.
4

Abstraction of Program Execution

Computational characteristic of run-time monitoring is closely related to abstract view on the target program execution. In this section, we provide an
abstract view on the target program execution. An execution of a program is
a sequence of program states as de ned in De nition 1. We de ne a state as
follows.
De nition 9 (State) A state s of a program execution is a pair of a time
stamp ts 2 R and an environment s  V ! R which is a function from a
set of variables V to a set of real values R.

7
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A state in an execution indicates variable change(s) at the time instant
corresponding to the state. si , however, does not change between time interval starting from a state si until the next state si ; the information of a
program remains xed between two states si and si . If we keep track of
variable updates, we can capture snapshots of si's.
Note that not all variables relate to requirement properties. A property p
may consist of expressions based on a variable v , but not v . Furthermore,
not every update of v changes evaluation of p . In other words, a monitor can
abstract out states whose updated variable values do not a ect evaluation of
p . We call this abstraction value abstraction. Value abstraction is a function
from an execution to a shorter execution consisting of less states. Let us
formulate value abstraction formally. We will use S 1 denoting S  [ S ! . Value
abstraction expVm abstracts out states which do not a ect expVm , a set of
boolean expressions over the monitored variables Vm.
+1

+1

1

1

1

2

1

1

De nition 10 (Value Abstraction) A value abstraction expVm with regard
to expVm , a set of boolean expressions over monitored variables Vm is a function
!
1
expVm : S ! S . expVm is de ned recursively as follows.
8
< exp (si  0 )
if 8e 2 expVm :[ e] si = [ e] si
Vm
0) =
(
s
s

expVm i i+1
: si exp (si+1  0 ) if 9e 2 expV :[ e]  6= [ e] 
m
si
si
Vm
+1

+1

where  0 is an in nite sequence of states, [ e] si for e 2 expVm is the result of
evaluating an boolean expression e according to an environment si , and i  0.

Note that De nition 10 itself does not impose any restriction on the set
expVm except that boolean expressions in the expVm should be expressions over
the monitored variables Vm. For value abstraction to be useful, expVm should
be related to requirement properties propreq .

De nition 11 (Valid Value Abstraction) Value abstraction expVm is valid
with regard to the set of requirement properties propreq if and only if


8j  0: 8e 2 expVm :[ e] sj = [ e] sj ! 8p 2 propreq :[ p] sj = [ p] sj
+1

+1

De nition 11 indicates that the removed states must not a ect evaluation of
requirement properties. The remaining states, however, may or may not a ect
evaluation result. In other words, valid value abstraction is sound, but not
complete.
So far, we have not decided how to set expVm with regard to propreq . In
one extreme end, expVm can be a set of entire requirement properties, i.e.,
expVm = propreq . In this case, the abstract view taken by the monitor is equal
to a sequence of fail/safe ags obtained by evaluating requirement properties.
In the other extreme end, expVm can be an empty set. In this case, no states are
removed by value abstraction. We need to decide a point between these two
extreme ends for setting expVm with regard to propreq satisfying De nition 11.
8
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For example, suppose that a requirement property is
preq = ((3 < x) ^ (x < 10)) _ (y > 2) ^ (z < 10)
One expVm satisfying De nition 11 with regard to preq is
expVm = f(3 < x) ^ (x < 10); z < 10g
With this expVm , for example, states updating x from 4 to 9 or states updating
z from 1 to 9 are removed by value abstraction because these states do not
change evaluation result of (3 < x) ^ (x < 10) or z < 10.
In practice, value abstraction is closely related to reduce monitoring overhead. To apply value abstraction, a probe need to test 8e 2 expVm :[ e] si =
[ e] si (see De nition 10) whenever a monitored variable is updated. Therefore, we have to consider both property evaluation overhead and probe's test
overhead to reduce the overall monitoring overhead. Section 5.3 describes how
Java-MaC implements value abstraction.
+1

5

Overview of the Java-MaC

The monitoring and checking (MaC) framework has been designed to ensure
that the execution of a real-time system is consistent with its requirements
at run-time. Java-MaC instruments Java bytecodes and monitors/checks the
correctness of the Java program's execution with regard to given formal requirement speci cation. The structure of the Java-MaC architecture is shown
in Fig 2. The architecture includes two main phases: static phase and runtime phase. A formal speci cation consists of a low-level implementation dependent speci cation and a high-level requirement speci cation. A low-level
speci cation language is called Primitive Event De nition Language (PEDL).
A high-level speci cation language is called Meta Event De nition Language
(MEDL). From a target program and PEDL/MEDL speci cations, the static
phase (before a target program runs) automatically generates run-time components including a lter, an event recognizer, and a run-time checker. In
the run-time phase (during the execution of a target program), information of
the target program execution is collected and checked against a given formal
requirement speci cation. More detail on Java-MaC can be found in[4,5]
Section 5.1 describes static phase of Java-MaC. Section 5.2 describes runtime phase of Java-MaC. Finally, Section 5.3 explains implementation of value
abstraction in Java-MaC.
5.1 Static Phase

Java-MaC has three static phase components: an instrumentor, a PEDL compiler, and a MEDL compiler. A PEDL compiler compiles a PEDL script into
an abstract syntax tree (pedl.out) which is evaluated by an event recognizer
at run-time. At the same time, a PEDL compiler generates instrumentation information (instrumentation.out) which is used by the instrumentor.
9
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target program
(*.class)

instrumentation
information

(instrumentation.out)

PEDL specification

MEDL specification

PEDL compiler

MEDL compiler

Static Phase
instrumentor

Run-time Phase
instrumented
target program

compiled PEDL
filter

(*.class)

compiled MEDL

(pedl.out)

(medl.out)

Event Recognizer
(interpreter of pedl.out )

Run-time Checker
(interpreter of medl.out )

Fig. 2. Structure of Java-MaC

In addition, a PEDL compiler generates expVm for value abstraction from
a PEDL script and puts expVm into instrumentation.out. A Java-MaC instrumentor takes a Java bytecode (*.class) and instrumentation information
(instrumentation.out) containing a list of monitored variables/methods and
expVm generated from a PEDL script. Based on these inputs, the Java-MaC
instrumentor inserts a lter consisting of probes into the target bytecode.
Each probe contains a routine testing whether 8e 2 expVm :[ e] si = [ e] si as
well as a routine for sending variable updates to an event recognizer.
A MEDL compiler compiles a MEDL script into an abstract syntax tree
(medl.out) which is evaluated by a run-time checker at run-time. More details
of instrumentor and PEDL/MEDL compilers are in [5].
+1

5.2 Run-time Phase

During the run-time phase, the instrumented target program is executed while
being monitored and checked with respect to a requirement speci cation.
A lter is a collection of probes inserted into the target program. The
essential functionality of a lter is to keep track of changes of monitored variables and send snapshots of program execution states to the event recognizer.
Furthermore, a lter tests 8e 2 expVm :[ e] si = [ e] si to decide whether a
snapshot should be sent to the event recognizer or not. An event recognizer
detects an event from the state information received from the lter. Events
are recognized according to a low-level speci cation. Recognized events are
sent to the run-time checker. Although it is conceivable to combine the event
recognizer with the lter, we chose to separate them to provide exibility in an
implementation of the architecture. A run-time checker determines whether
or not the current execution history satis es a requirement speci cation. The
execution history is captured from a sequence of events sent by the event
recognizer. The connection among these run-time components can be made
through one of socket, FIFO le, or user de ned communication methods.
10
+1

Kim et al
5.3 Implementation of Value Abstraction

Java-MaC sets expVm as a set of simple expressions obtained from event and
condition de nitions in a PEDL script. A simple expression consists of one
variable, a comparison operator, and a constant (ex. x < 5:4). For this set
of expVm , the amount of computation performed by probes for testing 8e 2
expVm :[ e] si = [ e] si is very little because comparison between a variable
and a constant is computationally cheap; probes do not perform any boolean
operations or numerical operations for the test.
Construction of expVm from a PEDL script is as follows.
(i) Extract simple expressions sevi j for each monitored variable vi from event
de nitions and condition de nitions in a PEDL script.
(ii) Unless either
 there exists a non -simple expression containing monitored variable vi
 there exists update(vi ) in event/condition de nitions
put sevi j into expVm .
If expVm contains sevi j , apply value abstraction whenever vi is updated. Otherwise, send vi to an event recognizer whenever vi is updated. When value
abstraction is applied, a probe monitoring a variable vi tests all sevij 2 expVm
whenever vi is updated. If any simple expression sevij fails the test, i.e. there
exists an sevi j which has changed its value according to update of vi, the probe
sends a new value of vi. Otherwise, not.
Consider the following example.
5

+1

6

condition c1 = (3 < x && x < 10) || z > 10;
condition c2 = x > 5 && y > 2*z + 3;

The variable x is used only in simple expressions. The lter keeps the truth
values of each of the three simple expressions (3 < x, x < 10, and x > 5)
that involve x and sends an update only when it changes one of the expression
values as in Figure 3. Variables y and z are used in an expression which is not
a simple expression. Thus, every update of y and z will be sent to the event
recognizer. Whether value abstraction can be applied to a variable x or not
can be decided by scanning a PEDL script by a PEDL compiler.
6

Example: the Sieve of Eratosthenes

We illustrate monitoring overhead and e ectiveness of value abstraction using
the Sieve of Eratosthenes program. The Sieve of Eratosthenes generates prime
numbers. The algorithm of the Sieve for generating prime numbers less than
5

We assume that all of event/condition de nitions in a PEDL script are used to build
requirement properties in a MEDL script.
6 update(v ) becomes true whenever v is updated.
i
i
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time
x
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3

5

10

updates of x which is not exported
updates of x which is exported

Fig. 3. Example of updating x

or equal to n can be described as follows.

Make a list of all the integers less than or equal to

n (and
than one).
pn,greater
then the numbers

Strike out the multiples of all primes less than or equal to
that are left are the primes. 7

We would like to monitor and check whether there exists a prime number
between 99990 and 100000. For that purpose, an event foundPrime is de ned
in lines 5 to 7 of Figure 4. The experiment shows that there exists one prime
between 99990 and 100000.
01:MonScr
02: export event foundPrime;
03: monobj int SieveMain.sa.numTested;
04: monobj int SieveMain.sa.numPrimes;
05: event foundPrime = update(SieveMain.sa.numPrimes) when
06:
(99990 <= SieveMain.sa.numTested
07:
&& SieveMain.sa.numTested <= 100000);
08:end

Fig. 4. PEDL script for checking the existence of prime between 99990 and 100000

Figure 5 shows a Java code for the Sieve of Eratosthenes. An integer
being tested is declared as numTested in line 14. numPrimes declared in line
15 indicates the total number of prime numbers upto numTested. Main code
in execute() from line 22 to line 42 contains a nested loop. Lines 30 to 41
form an outer loop which increases numTested one by one. Lines 33 to 35
make an inner
p loop which divides numTested with prime numbers less than
or equal to numTested. Lines 37 to 40 store numTested as a prime number
and increase numPrimes by 1 if there is no prime number which can divide
numTested.
pn)
The computational complexity of the Sieve program(Figure
5)
is
O
(
n
p
(the outer loop takes O(n) and the inner loop takes O( n)) where n is a max7

It is well-known mathematical fact that if there p
exists a prime greater than
divides n, there exists a prime less than or equal to n which divides n, too.
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01:public class SieveMain{
02:
Sieve sa;
03:
SieveMain() { sa = new Sieve();}
04:
public static void main(String[] args) {
05:
SieveMain sm = new SieveMain();
06:
sm.sa.initialize( Integer.parseInt(args[0]));
07:
sm.sa.execute();
08:
}
09:}
10:class Sieve {
11:
public Sieve sa;
12:
public int primes[];
13:
public int maxCandidate;
14:
public int numTested;
// current number being tested
15:
public int numPrimes;
// number of primes found
16:
17:
public void initialize(int i) {
18:
maxCandidate = i;
19:
primes = new int[maxCandidate];
20:
}
21:
22:
public void execute() {
23:
int k = 0;
24:
int sqrt_i=0;
25:
boolean flag = false;
26:
27:
primes[0] = 1;
28:
primes[1] = 2;
29:
numPrimes = 2;
30:
for (numTested = 3; numTested <= maxCandidate; numTested++) {
31:
k = 1;
32:
sqrt_i = (int)(Math.sqrt(i));
33:
for (flag = true; k < numPrimes && flag; k++)
34:
if ( primes[k] <= sqrt_i && numTested % primes[k] == 0)
35:
flag = false;
36:
37:
if (flag) {
38:
numPrimes++;
39:
primes[numPrimes - 1] = numTested;
40:
}
41:
}
42:
}
43:}

Fig. 5. The code of the Sieve of Eratosthenes
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imum number to check. The Sieve program sends around 1.08n snapshots
to an event recognizer (nnumTested + 0:08numPrimes).
We performed the experiment using Linux 2.2 machine (2X 550 Mhz PIII,
1GB memory, IBM JDK 1.3.1) and Windows 2000 machine (1.4Ghz PIV,
512MB memory, Sun JDK 1.3.1). The sieve program runs on Linux machine. Event recognizer runs on Windows 2000 machine. The bottom line of
Figure 6.a) shows the execution time of the uninstrumented Sieve program.
Testing integers from 1 to 200000 takes 2.3 seconds. Testing integers from 1
to 800000, however, takes 22.6 seconds.p The frequency of taking snapshots
decreases as n increases because of O(n n) computational complexity of the
Sieve program, which decreases the overhead ratio by Java-MaC as n increases.
Figure 6.b) shows the overhead ratios of NoAbstract, and ValueAbstract. NoAbstract slows down the Sieve program 3.1 times when n is 200000. The overhead
ratio decreases to 1.5 times when n increases to 800000. ValueAbstract reduces
the overhead 73% compared to the overhead of NoAbstract when n is 200000.
As n increases, the bottleneck of event evaluation diminishes, which decreases
the amount of reduction by ValueAbstract.
a)
b)

Fig. 6. Overhead to the Sieve of Eratosthenes (a) Execution time (b) Overhead
ratio

7

Conclusion

We have described theoretical study as well as practical implication of computational characteristics of run-time monitoring. We de ne the class of properties run-time monitoring can evaluate accurately; a class of monitorable
properties is a strict subset of a class of safety properties. In addition, we
proved that evaluating properties written in process algebra takes intractable
time by transforming 3SAT problem to the trace validity problem. Finally, a
sound abstraction of the target program's execution is developed which lters
14
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out states unrelavant to the requirement properties. Java-MaC uses value abstraction to reduce the property evaluation overhead. Value abstraction is a
quite e ective technique to reduce overhead, as we have seen in the case study
of the Sieve of Erathosthenes, where monitoring overhead is reduced 73% by
value abstraction.
This paper focuses on mathematical treatment of monitoring overhead.
Equally important topic is to measure and limit the range of monitoring overhead. This topic is important because safety real-time systems require the
upper bound of worst case execution time for their guarantee of correct execution. We are investigating real-time JVM as we upgrade Java-MaC to
incorporate steering features. Another topic is to take more advantage of
value abstraction. Current implementation of Java-MaC tests only simple expressions for value abstraction in order to minimize probe's overhead. More
aggressive way of applying value abstraction, i.e. setting expVm not only simple expressions, but more compound ones seems promising. Also, we may
analyze execution history statistically to maximize states reduction of value
abstraction.
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